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Latin America is today the world region in which inequality is highest,
with an average Gini coe‰cient above 50 during the last four decades of
the twentieth century (Deininger and Squire, 1996; 1998). A stable in-
come distribution in the early postwar period worsened after 1980 (Alti-
mir 1987; Morley 2000). Furthermore, no significant improvement in the
relationship between income distribution and economic growth has taken
place during the last decade (London˜o and Sze´kely 2000), and inequality
remains high despite episodes of sustained growth (ECLAC 2000).
Is today’s high inequality a permanent feature of modern Latin Ameri-
can history? How has inequality a¤ected poverty in the long run? These
are pressing questions for social scientists. Unfortunately, no quantitative
assessment of long-run inequality has been carried out for Latin America,
except for Uruguay (Be´rtola 2005), but the perception of unrelenting in-
equality deeply rooted in the past is widespread (see, for example, Bour-
guignon and Morrisson’s (2002) assumptions).
In this chapter I first examine long-run trends in inequality in modern
Latin America and then, on the basis of trends in inequality and growth,
make a preliminary attempt at calibrating their impact on poverty
reduction.
When did inequality originate, and why has it persisted over time?
Alternative interpretations have been put forward. Those that emphasize
its colonial roots are worth stressing. According to Engerman and Sokol-
o¤ (1997), initial inequality of wealth, human capital, and political power
conditioned institutional design, and hence performance, in Spanish
America. Large-scale estates, built on pre-conquest social organization
and an extensive supply of native labor, established the initial levels of in-
equality. In the post-independence world, elites designed institutions pro-
tecting their privileges. In such a path-dependent framework government
policies and institutions restricted competition and o¤ered opportunities
to select groups (Sokolo¤ and Engerman 2000).
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) provide a di¤erent explana-
tion for the uneven fate of former colonies. Where abundant population
showed relative a¿uence, ‘‘extractive institutions’’ were established, under
which most of the population risks expropriation at the hands of the
ruling elite or the government (forced labor and tributes, often existing
already in the pre-colonial era, over the locals). With political power
concentrated in the hands of an elite, this represented the most e‰cient
choice for European colonizers despite its negative e¤ects on long-term
growth. This would be the case of the Iberian empires in the Americas,
especially in its economic centers of Peru and New Spain.
The opening up to the international economy has been associated with
a widening of income di¤erences within and across countries. Dependent-
ists have seen it as a cause of increasing inequality across and within
countries, stressing the role of the terms of trade in Latin American retar-
dation as countries either improved and shifted resources to primary pro-
duction (Singer 1950) or deteriorated and provoked immiserizing growth
(Prebisch 1950). Neoclassical trade theory predicts that trade liberaliza-
tion after independence would allow Latin American countries to spe-
cialize along the lines of comparative advantage. The Heckscher-Ohlin
model predicts that natural resources, as the abundant factor, will be
intensively used and, as a result, their relative price in terms of labor
will increase. This implies, in the Stolper-Samuelson extension of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, that insofar as land, the abundant factor, is
more unequally distributed than labor, inequality will rise within national
borders.
No evidence on inequality is available for the pre-1870 period with the
exception of Argentina, for which Newland and Ortiz (2001) show that
the expansion in the pastoral sector resulting from improved terms of
trade increased the reward of capital and land, the most intensively used
factors, while the farming sector contracted and the returns of its inten-
sive factor, labor, declined, as confirmed by the drop in nominal wages.
A redistribution of income in favor of owners of capital and land at the
expense of workers took place in Argentina between 1820 and 1870. Wil-
liamson (1999) has explored the consequences for inequality of the early
phase of globalization (1870–1914). On the basis of the wage-land rental
ratio, he showed an increase of inequality within countries in Argentina
and Uruguay that confirms empirically the Stolper-Samuelson theoretical
predictions. As natural resources were the abundant productive factor in
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Latin America, they were more intensively used in the production of
exportable commodities. As a result, returns to land grew, relative to
those of labor. Since the ownership of natural resources is more concen-
trated than that of labor, income distribution tended to be skewed toward
landowners, and inequality rose over the decades prior to World War I.
Presumably, inequality trends reversed in the interwar period, when glob-
alization was interrupted, as suggested by the fact that the steep decline in
the wage-rental ratio stopped in Argentina and Uruguay, and rose in the
1930s (Be´rtola and Williamson 2005). Globalization after 1980 has also
been associated with rising inequality in Latin America.
Lewis’s (1954) labor surplus model, in which the worker fails to share
in GDP per capita growth because elastic labor supplies (migration of
surplus labor from southern Europe, especially Spain and Italy) keep
wages and living standards stable, also provides the basis of an interpre-
tation of rising inequality in Argentina (Dı´az-Alejandro 1970) and Brazil
(Le¤ 1982) during the early phase of globalization.
But, can we quantify trends in income inequality in modern Latin
America? Lack of historical household surveys prevents replication of
modern inequality studies. Only after careful and painstaking research,
country by country, can standard inequality measures be provided for
Latin America’s past.
An approach to assessing inequality has been proposed and applied to
a wide international sample over 1870–1940 by Williamson (2002): the
ratio of GDP per worker to unskilled wages. The rationale for this choice
is that such a ratio confronts the returns to unskilled labor with the
returns to all production factors, that is, GDP. Since unskilled labor is
the more evenly distributed factor of production in developing countries,
an increase in the ratio suggests that inequality is rising. So, in order to
convey an idea of how inequality has evolved within Latin American
societies, I have constructed Williamson’s inequality index as the ratio
of real GDP per worker to real wages, normalized with 1913 ¼ 1 (see
appendix).
Long-run trends in inequality derived with 11-year centered moving
averages are presented for a group of main Latin American countries
in figures 12.1a and 12.1b. A sustained rise in the inequality index from
the late nineteenth century up to World War I is observed for the South-
ern Cone (no data available for Colombia) during the early phase of
globalization (figure 12.1a). Conversely, a decline in inequality took place
in the interwar years, as globalization was reversed. This view con-
firms the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation. The stabilization or decline of
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Figure 12.1a
Inequality indices in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela (1913 ¼ 1).
Figure 12.1b
Inequality indices in Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico (1913 ¼ 1).
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inequality during the mid-twentieth century could be related, as Be´rtola
(2005) points out, to urbanization and the emerging role of government.
Redistributive policies, as suggested by the rise of income tax share of
government revenues in the thirties and forties (Astorga and Fitzgerald
1998, 346), are correlated with the decline in the inequality index in Ar-
gentina and Chile and its stagnation in Uruguay. The sustained rise in in-
equality exhibited between the late thirties and fifties in Colombia
coincides with the ‘‘violencia’’ period (Palacios 1995).
In figure 12.1b trends in inequality are shown for Brazil, Cuba, and
Mexico. Brazil presents a long-run decline up to 1913, with a flat phase
between the late 1860s and 1890s, and Mexico shows a moderate increase
in inequality between the 1880s and the revolution of 1910. Scattered evi-
dence for Cuba suggests a similar pattern. A dramatic increase in inequal-
ity took place in the three countries after 1910 and well into the 1920s,
followed by stabilization over the 1930s in Brazil and Cuba. A gradual
rise in inequality in Brazil contrasts with the inequality reduction in Cuba
between the early 1940s and the late 1950s. If the data on Cuba are taken
at face value, the 1959 revolution would have occurred in a context of in-
equality stability after a sustained fall in a context of stagnated per capita
income. The case of Mexico provides some perplexities, too. The after-
math of the 1910 revolution was a period of rising inequality followed by
a dramatic inequality reduction. Then, between the mid-thirties and the
mid-fifties—years of accelerating per capita GDP growth due to improv-
ing labor productivity and employment creation—a spectacular rise in
the inequality would have taken place.
But how was the long-run evolution of inequality? A heuristic exercise
in which available Gini coe‰cients (mainly from 1950 onward) are pro-
jected backward with the rate of variation of the ‘‘inequality indices,’’
previously smoothed with 11-year moving averages, is provided in table
12.1, so conjectures about long-run inequality trends can be derived (see
appendix). No doubt the pseudo-Gini indices derived prior to the mid-
twentieth century are questionable. By using changes in the inequality
index to project Gini coe‰cients backward, a new time series is created
in which two di¤erent cardinal measures are used: the directly estimated
Gini and the backward projection. These cardinal representations of ordi-
nal inequality measures might result in large discrepancies. Nonetheless,
it can be argued that because the inequality index can be interpreted as
the ratio between a quantile of the income distribution (wage rates per
day or hour) and the mean of the distribution (GDP per EAP), backward
projections of Gini directly estimated coe‰cients could be consistent with
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‘‘first-order inequality dominance.’’ In other words, the amplitude of the
swings in the pseudo-Gini indices could be wrong, but not the tendency.1
Several features in long-run inequality are worth highlighting. Inequal-
ity rose steadily until it reached a high plateau, which stabilized over the
last four decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, persistent high
inequality seems to be confirmed at least since the Great Depression.
Another relevant feature is the wide variance across Latin American
countries, with Gini indices ranging from 40 to almost 60. Nonetheless,
countries’ positions in the inequality ranking are not fixed. Southern
Cone nations (Argentina and Chile) exhibited the highest inequality levels
until the interwar years, when inequality rose in Mexico, Brazil, and Co-
lombia, countries that by 1950 achieved an unenviable lead in inequality.
Table 12.1
Income Distribution in Latin America: Gini Estimates and Conjectures, 1850–1990
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913
Argentina 39.1 39.7 43.6 42.0 61.8
Bolivia
Brazil 46.2 37.2 32.9 33.0 34.4 29.8 29.5
Chile 36.6 40.7 41.3 47.2 51.9 58.5 65.5
Colombia 46.8
Costa Rica
Dominican R.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico 27.8
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay 29.6 33.1 32.2 38.4 45.9
Venezuela
LatAm4 34.8 35.9 38.0 35.4 40.5
LatAm6 37.7
LatAm15
LatAm16
Note: Gini direct estimates are shown in bold; otherwise, pseudo-Gini (backward projection
of Gini using variation of inequality Indices).
LatAm4: population-weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
LatAm6: population-weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and
Uruguay.
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It is also worth noticing the inequality decline in Venezuela during the
1950s and the worsening of Chilean income distribution of the 1970s and
1980s. Meanwhile, Uruguay appears to follow, at least until 1960, the Eu-
ropean pattern of inequality.
An attempt to provide a regional view is shown in figure 12.2. Two
phases of inequality expansion, one before 1929 and the other from
World War II to 1960, are noticeable; and a fall in inequality is evident
in the 1890s (associated with the Baring crisis) and in the Great Depres-
sion years. The sustained rise in inequality since 1900 reached a high pla-
teau in the 1960s. This remained stable over the last four decades of the
twentieth century and dwarfed the contraction in inequality of the 1970s
and its rise during the 1980s.
Table 12.1
Income Distribution in Latin America: Gini Estimates and Conjectures, 1850–1990
1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 49.3 50.0 39.6 41.4 41.2 47.2 47.7
Bolivia 53.0 53.4 54.5
Brazil 47.2 46.4 55.4 57.0 57.1 57.1 57.3
Chile 49.2 40.5 41.7 48.2 47.4 53.1 54.7
Colombia 40.2 45.0 51.0 54.0 57.3 48.8 56.7
Costa Rica 30.7 50.0 44.5 48.5 46.0
Dominican R. 32.4 34.6 45.5 42.1 48.1
Ecuador 57.1 61.0 60.1 54.2 56.0
El Salvador 44.0 42.4 46.5 48.4 50.5
Guatemala 42.3 28.6 30.0 49.7 59.9
Honduras 57.1 66.0 61.8 54.9 57.0
Mexico 24.3 30.4 55.0 60.6 57.9 50.9 53.1
Nicaragua 68.1 63.2 57.9 56.7
Panama 56.4 50.0 58.4 47.5 56.3
Paraguay 45.1 57.0
Peru 39.2 61.0 48.5 43.0 46.4
Uruguay 36.6 34.9 37.9 37.0 42.8 43.6 40.6
Venezuela 61.3 46.2 48.0 44.7 44.0
LatAm4 47.5 46.4 50.4 52.7 53.1 54.9 55.2
LatAm6 41.6 42.8 51.5 54.7 54.8 53.2 54.8
LatAm15 50.6 53.9 53.5 51.9 53.7
LatAm16 54.0 53.6 52.0 53.8
LatAm15: population-weighted average of all Latin American countries but Bolivia, Cuba,
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.
LatAm16: population-weighted average of all Latin American countries but Bolivia, Cuba,
Haiti, and Paraguay.
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Inequality trends before World War I can be interpreted in Stolper-
Samuelson terms. Thus, when Latin America opened up to international
competition after independence, especially from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury to World War I, the relative position of land improved, and because
land was unevenly distributed, inequality tended ceteris paribus to in-
crease. Predictable are the reduction in inequality as the economy of
Latin America closed up during the interwar period, and a new surge
in inequality during the second wave of globalization (1950–1980). Natu-
rally, the impact on income distribution of international trade and factor
mobility is not the only force at play. Industrialization and redistributive
forces from an increasing role of government also appear to have a¤ected
inequality reduction in Latin America during the twentieth century.
It is worth noting that inequality often appears to be positively corre-
lated with economic growth, as suggested by the correspondence between
rising inequality and per capita income before 1913 (especially in the
Southern Cone) and after 1950, and their decline in the interwar period
(see tables 12.1 and 12.2). Was there a trade-o¤ between growth and in-
equality in Latin America? This question demands careful investigation.
Long-Run Trends in Poverty
Poverty reduction depends on the growth of average income and on how
income is distributed, and is closely linked to the sensitivity of poverty to
Figure 12.2
Gini estimates and conjectures for Latin America (population-weighted averages).
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both (growth elasticity and inequality elasticity of poverty). Initial levels
of development and inequality also condition the impact on poverty of
growth and improvements in income distribution (Bourguignon 2003;
Klasen 2004; Lo´pez 2004; Ravallion 1997; 2004).
How did inequality and economic growth impinge on poverty in Latin
America? In this section I focus on absolute growth of the poor’s incomes
(Ravallion and Chen 2003) rather than on whether a relatively dispropor-
tionate growth in the poor’s incomes took place (Kakwani and Pernia
2000). In a heuristic exercise, I calibrate trends of absolute poverty from
which hypotheses for further research can be derived.
A glance at Latin America’s long-run economic growth is provided in
table 12.2. In addition to country estimates, growth rates are presented for
population-weighted averages of real GDP per head for di¤erent groups
of Latin American countries (the lengthier the coverage, the lower the
number of countries included). Some features can be noted. First, the ori-
gins of modern economic growth, as defined by a sustained increase in
output per person, can be traced back to at least the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Latin America experienced a sustained and steady growth over
more than a century, only broken during the 1890s, the Great Depres-
sion, and especially the 1980s crisis. Fortunately, though, the picture of
Latin America’s performance seems quite robust. After a slow start in
the mid-nineteenth century, Latin America appears to have grown signifi-
cantly during the 1870s and 1880s and, after a slowdown in the 1890s, to
have accelerated until World War I. Latin America’s output per head
slowed because of World War I and halted in the years of the Great De-
pression. After the Depression, its countries enjoyed their fastest phase of
growth, which lasted more than four decades. Their somewhat longer
than the so-called Golden Age (1950–1973). The 1980s represent a major
break in the long-run performance of Latin America, which with only
a partial revival in the 1990s. Thus, while the growth of the early phase,
1860s–1929, was surpassed by the performance of the 1930s–1980, the
post-1980 era is a phase of slowing down. To sum up, modern Latin
America experienced sustained growth since the mid-nineteenth century,
that was only brought to a halt during the 1980s.
Latin America is consists of a heterogeneous group of countries that
exhibit substantial discrepancies in their factor endowments and long-
run performance. The high variance of growth rates of GDP per capita
in Latin America proves it. In Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, income per
head grew faster than Latin America’s average between 1870 and 1913,
whereas in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela this happened in
1913–1938. On the whole, during the early phase of modern economic
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growth (1870–1929), Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and to lesser extent Ar-
gentina grew faster than the region’s average. In the second phase of sus-
tained expansion (1938–1980), Mexico and especially Brazil exceeded the
average, and Chile stands alone above the average in the last two decades
of the twentieth century.
But did economic growth reach the lower deciles of income distribution
and hence help reduce absolute poverty? High dependence rates in Latin
America resulting from a delayed demographic transition help explain
lower levels of GDP per person, and hence higher poverty, in Latin
America (figure 12.3).2 The persistence of high dependency rates in Latin
America hint at the lack of incentives to reduce fertility provided by the
institutional framework and at a weak demand for human capital, which
had helped bring about the demographic transition in OECD countries
(Galor 2004).
The poor are unevenly distributed and more concentrated in rural areas
in Latin America. Improving labor productivity increases rural incomes
and helps to reduce inequality as well as to promote growth; thus it may
contribute to poverty reduction. Usually, rural-urban migration is accom-
panied by rising productivity in agriculture, and as a whole, rural-urban
migration tends to have a positive impact on poverty reduction.
Table 12.3 provides evidence of a sustained decline in the share of agri-
culture in total employment, which fell below one-fifth of total employ-
ment in countries of the Southern Cone, Cuba, and Venezuela during
Figure 12.3
Dependence rate in Latin America (population-weighted averages).
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the phase of sustained growth, 1938–1980. Alas, this trend cannot be gen-
eralized. Haiti, Guatemala, and Bolivia kept half or more of the labor
force in the primary sector, and several others, including Mexico and
Peru, still maintained more than one-third of workers in agriculture by
1990. The labor productivity gap between agriculture and the economy
as a whole tended to close over the same period (table 12.4), but, again,
the correspondence between those countries experiencing a long-run
decline in agricultural employment and those in which the productivity
gap exhibited a shrinking trend appears weak, and only includes Argen-
tina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Cuba
reduced the relative size of agricultural employment while keeping a sub-
stantial intersectoral productivity gap. Conversely, Colombia and Central
America maintained high proportions of labor in agriculture while the av-
erage labor productivity gap was closing (actually, it closed completely in
Nicaragua). Reliance on cash crops helps explain why this was the case.
The shift from countryside to cities is confirmed by increasing urbaniza-
Table 12.3
Share of Economically Active Population in Agriculture, 1900–1990
1900 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.12
Bolivia 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.47
Brazil 0.71 0.69 0.62 0.55 0.47 0.37 0.23
Chile 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.19
Colombia 0.73 0.59 0.52 0.45 0.40 0.27
Costa Rica 0.57 0.51 0.43 0.35 0.26
Cuba 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.18
Dominican R. 0.73 0.64 0.48 0.32 0.25
Ecuador 0.65 0.59 0.52 0.40 0.33
El Salvador 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.44 0.36
Guatemala 0.69 0.66 0.61 0.54 0.52
Haiti 0.86 0.80 0.74 0.71 0.68
Honduras 0.75 0.72 0.67 0.57 0.41
Mexico 0.62 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.54 0.50 0.36 0.35
Nicaragua 0.70 0.63 0.51 0.40 0.29
Panama 0.56 0.51 0.42 0.29 0.26
Paraguay 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.39
Peru 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.40 0.36
Uruguay 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.14
Venezuela 0.59 0.54 0.43 0.33 0.26 0.15 0.12
Source: Astorga, Berge´s, and Fitzgerald (2004).
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tion (table 12.5), which reached beyond four-fifths of the population in
the Southern Cone, Brazil, and Venezuela in 2000 but still remained be-
low half the population in Central America and Haiti.
Because low rural living standards relative to urban ones are said to be
an obstacle to the impact of growth on absolute poverty reduction (Kla-
sen 2004), I have computed crude rural-urban gap in terms of per capita
income. In order to do so, I assumed that incomes in the countryside
accrued mostly from agriculture. It is true that those living in rural areas
also produce services and light industrial goods, but the opposite could
also be said of some of those living in cities (‘‘agro-cities,’’ because they
continue supplying labor to agricultural tasks at peak season). If agricul-
tural output is divided by population living in nonurban areas, a lower
bound for rural incomes can be obtained. Its ratio to average incomes
(per capita GDP) provides a crude indicator of the income gap between
countryside and the city (table 12.6).
Table 12.4
Relative Labor Productivity in Agriculture, 1900–1990
1900 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.77 0.82 0.85 1.20
Bolivia 0.46 0.44 0.31 0.28 0.32
Brazil 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.34
Chile 0.44 0.42 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.43
Colombia 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.91
Costa Rica 0.67 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.84
Cuba 0.51 0.52 0.64 0.52 0.51
Dominican R. 0.47 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.64
Ecuador 0.64 0.66 0.58 0.53 0.78
El Salvador 0.63 0.58 0.54 0.77 0.86
Guatemala 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.51
Haiti 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.56 0.58
Honduras 0.60 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.75
Mexico 0.45 0.37 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.24 0.22
Nicaragua 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.75 1.09
Panama 0.58 0.51 0.38 0.48 0.59
Paraguay 0.75 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.80
Peru 0.40 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.57
Uruguay 0.56 0.52 0.68 0.64 0.78
Venezuela 0.40 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.49 0.68
Source: Astorga, Berge´s, and Fitzgerald (2004).
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The evolution of the rural-urban income gap again yields ambiguous
results. Although by the end of the twentieth century it closed dramati-
cally in Colombia and Peru, and even reversed in Argentina, Uruguay,
and Nicaragua, it remained large in Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean. Thus the population residing in the countryside shrank
throughout the twentieth century, and in many instances the rural-urban
gap was reduced. Yet by 1990 a non-negligible share of the population,
especially in the northern section of Latin America, remained in rural
areas living on a substantially lower income than those in the city. Such
high concentration of population in rural areas tends unequivocally to
suggest poverty.
I then examine the evolution of absolute poverty as defined by a fixed
international poverty line. Given the fact that Latin America, although
exhibiting persistently high inequality, is not among the poorest regions
of the world, I decided to use a poverty line (PL) equivalent to 1985
Table 12.5
Urbanization Rates in Latin America, 1850–2000
1850 1870 1890 1913 1929 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Argentina 0.15 0.16 0.30 0.37 0.49 0.64 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.89
Bolivia 0.22 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.46 0.56 0.65
Brazil 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.36 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.75 0.81
Chile 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.33 0.43 0.57 0.68 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.85
Colombia 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.35 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.70 0.75
Costa Rica 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.52
Cuba 0.18 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.54 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.74 0.75
Dominican R. 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.58 0.65
Ecuador 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.62
El Salvador 0.26 0.45 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.47
Guatemala 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.40
Haiti 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.36
Honduras 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.42 0.47
Mexico 0.16 0.19 0.27 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.73 0.74
Nicaragua 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.35 0.40 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.65
Panama 0.14 0.25 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.58
Paraguay 0.20 0.37 0.24 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.56
Peru 0.12 0.25 0.42 0.46 0.57 0.65 0.69 0.73
Uruguay 0.16 0.29 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.63 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.91
Venezuela 0.11 0.13 0.27 0.43 0.61 0.72 0.79 0.84 0.87
Sources: Astorga, Berge´s, and Fitzgerald (2004) backward projected with data in Flora
(1981), except Chile; Cariola and Sunkel (1982, 144) for Chile, since 1870.
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Geary-Khamis $4 per day instead of just $1 or $2. Adjusted by the U.S.
implicit GDP deflator, it represents in 1980 prices $3.1 per day (purchas-
ing power adjusted), that is, $1,130 per person per year, or $4,521 per year
for a four-member family unit.3 On average, in Latin America, per capita
income remained below the poverty line until World War I and did not
double it until the 1960s.
In the ongoing debate on pro-poor growth, few views are shared. One
of them is that a low level of development probably hampered the impact
of growth on poverty reduction (Deiniger and Squire 1998). Moreover,
the higher the initial level of inequality, the lower the reduction in poverty
for a given rate of growth in GDP per head. Hence, the high levels of
inequality shown in table 12.1 may have represented a deterrent for a
deeper impact of growth on the poor. As Ravallion (2004) puts it, ‘‘Pov-
erty responds slowly to growth in high inequality countries.’’
Measuring pro-poor growth is highly demanding in terms of empiri-
cal evidence, and data on income distribution, at least by quintile, are
Table 12.6
Relative Rural Income per Head in Latin America, 1900–2000
1900 1913 1929 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Argentina 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.60 0.61 0.65 1.08 1.08
Bolivia 0.39 0.40 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.39
Brazil 0.29 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.47
Chile 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.39 0.48 0.40
Colombia 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.79 0.84
Costa Rica 0.25 0.58 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.40 0.25
Cuba 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.31
Dominican R. 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.39
Ecuador 0.59 0.60 0.49 0.40 0.58 0.66
El Salvador 0.79 0.65 0.58 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.42
Guatemala 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.41
Haiti 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.52 0.56 0.57
Honduras 0.74 0.65 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.52
Mexico 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.26
Nicaragua 0.87 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.60 0.67 1.05
Panama 0.51 0.44 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.29
Paraguay 0.62 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.61 0.70
Peru 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.66 0.85
Uruguay 0.36 0.55 0.71 0.71 0.99 1.15
Venezuela 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.51 0.59
Note: GDP per capita ¼ 1.
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required. Alas, there are no microeconomic data available on household
expenditures to compute historical trends and levels of poverty in Latin
America. In these circumstances, Bourguignon and Morrisson’s (2002)
strategy of assuming that income distribution remained unaltered in Latin
America from independence to the mid-twentieth century is very appeal-
ing. Given a fixed poverty line and the proportion of population below
that line for the present, it would su‰ce to know the growth rate of GDP
per head in order to compute levels of absolute poverty for the past. In
fact, research findings state that a large proportion of long-run changes
in poverty are accounted for by the growth in averages incomes (Kraay
2004), and hence they emphasize the protection of property rights, stable
macroeconomic policies, and openness to international trade as means of
growth and poverty suppression (Klasen 2004; OECD 2004). However,
assuming a one-for-one reduction in poverty with per capita GDP growth
seems a gross misrepresentation, and some economists have proposed to
introduce a poverty elasticity of growth that would be lower, the higher
the initial level of inequality (Ravallion 2004).
I carried out a calibration exercise of the impact on absolute poverty in
Latin America resulting from the trends described for per capita GDP
and inequality. To do so, I drew on Lo´pez and Serve´n’s (2006) empirical
research that uses the largest and probably the best microdata set so far
for a wide sample of developing and developed countries over the last
four decades. They follow a parametric approach and find that the
observed distribution of income is consistent with the hypothesis of log
normality. Under log normality, the contribution of growth and inequal-
ity to changes in poverty levels only depends on the average incomes ratio
to the defined poverty line and the degree of inequality as measured by
the Gini coe‰cient:
Po ¼ F log z=n
s
þ s
2
 
;
where s ¼ ffiffiffi2p F1ðð1þ GÞ=2Þ, and Po is the poverty head count, that is,
the share of population below the poverty line; F is a cumulative normal
distribution; n is average per capita income; z is the poverty line; s is the
standard deviation of the distribution; and G is the Gini coe‰cient.
Thus, all that is needed to carry out the poverty head count calibration
is the poverty line/average income ratio and the Gini coe‰cient. Unfortu-
nately, as noted, direct Gini estimates are available only for the late twen-
tieth century. By splicing the inequality index with the Gini coe‰cients
for the ‘‘statistical era,’’ a long-run series of pseudo-Gini can be derived.
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The highly tentative results from this heuristic exercise provide explicit
conjectures on poverty trends and hopefully o¤er testable hypotheses for
further research.
Table 12.7 summarizes the results of the conjectural exercise. A word
of warning is necessary. The measurement error of the poverty levels
is possibly high before the late twentieth century because I rely on Gini
guesstimates. But trends in poverty are much better captured because the
GDP per worker/unskilled wage ratio seems to capture inequality tenden-
cies rather well. Moreover, the other element to be taken on board, the
GDP per head/poverty line ratio, is much more accurately estimated and
the Lo´pez and Serve´n (2006) model employed in the calibration is one of
the more robust measures of the complex relationship between growth,
inequality, and poverty.
The main finding of the calibration exercise is that absolute poverty has
experienced a long-run decline in Latin America since the late nineteenth
century, only arrested in the 1890s and the 1930s and reversed in the 1980s
(figure 12.4). In fact, the same two phases observed for Latin America’s
growth can be observed for the evolution of poverty: 1870–1929, inter-
rupted during the 1890s (Baring crisis years) and accelerated in the years
from World War I to the Great Depression; and a steady acceleration in
poverty decline between World War II and 1980. Once again, the 1980s
stand out as an exceptional decade in which poverty increased across the
board.
As regards the absolute number of poor, it grew over time as popula-
tion expanded in response to high fertility rates; only in the 1970s did
the number of poor actually fall, only to rise again in the 1980s. For an
18-country sample (all Latin America except Cuba and Haiti) the number
of poor went from 93.8 million in 1980 to 127.4 million in 1990, when an
absolute poverty line of 1985 Geary-Khamis $4 per day per person is
used.
The high coincidence between phases of growth and poverty reduction
makes sense; long-run inequality appears to rise to a high plateau, where
it has relatively stabilized. It could be argued, along Kakwani and
Pernia’s (2000) lines, that as inequality remained relatively stable across
Latin American countries throughout the second half of the twentieth
century, economic growth resulted in proportional increases in the
incomes of the poor, and hence pro-poor growth stricto sensu never
occurred. Here, however, a less strict yardstick for the measurement of
poverty is accepted, and a reduction in the share of population below the
fixed poverty line is taken as a reduction in absolute poverty.
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Could it be said, then, that long-run poverty reduction in Latin Amer-
ica was led exclusively by the growth in average incomes? A glance at the
numbers in tables 12.1, 12.2, and 12.6 indicates that when we descend to
country level, this regularity is not confirmed. True, growth is the only
force behind poverty reduction during 1870–1890 in Argentina and Chile,
but this is not the case for the episode of substantial poverty contraction,
1913–1929, in which the fall in inequality played a significant role while
per capita GDP growth decelerated, as confirmed by the national experi-
ences of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Growth, however, was the single
force behind poverty decline in Brazil and almost exclusively in Colombia
during the same period. A combination of inequality contraction and
growth lies behind the fall in poverty levels in Argentina between the late
Table 12.7
Poverty Head Count in Latin America, 1850–1990
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913
Argentina 64 60 53 56 58
Bolivia
Brazil 93 96 96 96 95 98 93
Chile 94 89 84 74 71 70 65
Colombia 90
Costa Rica
Dominican R.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico 43
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay 45 48 42 43 32
Venezuela
LatAm4 89 85 84 85 81
LatAm6 71
LatAm15
LatAm16
Notes: 1985 Geary-Kamis $4 per day per person—a calibration (percent).
LatAm4: population-weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
LatAm6: population-weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and
Uruguay.
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1930s and the early 1950s, and in Venezuela and Peru during the 1950s
and 1960s, respectively. Public redistributive policies (progressive taxes,
transfers, and other government spending) seem to have mattered for
poverty reduction (Astorga and Fitzgerald 1998).
In the second half of the twentieth century, however, growth emerges
as the most prominent element underlying the reduction in absolute pov-
erty. Examples are provided by Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s. This
fact perhaps explains why absolute poverty levels remain high in 1990.
Growth itself apparently did not su‰ce to cut down poverty sharply.
High persistent inequality prevented a deeper impact on poverty reduc-
tion resulting from the intense growth of the 1950–1980 years, as the
cases of Brazil and Colombia exemplify, with still one-third of their
Table 12.7
Poverty Head Count in Latin America, 1850–1990
1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 41 45 24 22 10 11 17
Bolivia 65 71
Brazil 82 79 75 64 53 33 34
Chile 47 42 36 36 28 31 29
Colombia 70 65 61 57 52 32 37
Costa Rica 54 55 35 28 25
Dominican R. 83 71 64 43 53
Ecuador 87 84 79 66 43
El Salvador 74 66 58 58 64
Guatemala 63 52 37 44 59
Honduras 80 80 76 70 71
Mexico 31 36 43 41 27 13 15
Nicaragua 64 47 53 70
Panama 69 58 48 28 42
Paraguay 44 54
Peru 60 62 43 29 48
Uruguay 15 12 11 8 12 8 6
Venezuela 43 14 11 8 11
LatAm4 67 66 59 52 43 29 30
LatAm6 59 60 55 50 40 25 27
LatAm15 57 51 41 27 30
LatAm16 51 41 27 30
LatAm15: population-weighted average of all Latin American countries but Bolivia, Cuba,
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.
LatAm16: population-weighted average of all Latin American countries but Bolivia, Cuba,
Haiti, and Paraguay.
Inequality and Poverty in Latin America 309
populations below the poverty line. Despite sustained growth in the long
run, absolute poverty remainedhigh inLatinAmerica at the end of the twen-
tieth century (above one-fourth in 1980 and nearly one-third in 1990).
Moreover, the variance across nations has widened (the unweighted coef-
ficient of variation for a 15-country sample rose from 0.37 in 1950 to 1.08
in 1990). In 1980, for example, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile had a poverty
head count of around one-third of their populations, and Venezuela and
Uruguay were below two digits, and Mexico and Argentina slightly
above. A look at small countries reveals that, for instance, in Central
America, absolute poverty a¤ected—if Costa Rica is excluded—half its
population in 1980 and reached two-thirds in 1990. Andean countries
(Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) also exhibited spectacular poverty levels
in 1990. Actually, if Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Mexico are
excluded, the poverty head count in Latin America reached one-half of
the population at the end of the twentieth century.
Conclusions
This chapter has addressed some recurrent questions. Is inequality a long-
run curse? How did trends in inequality and growth a¤ect poverty?
Unfortunately, only tentative conclusions that provide hypotheses for fur-
ther research can be o¤ered.
Figure 12.4
Poverty head count in Latin America (population-weighted averages).
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Persistent high inequality is confirmed by historical evidence, with
Gini indices ranging from 40 to almost 60. However, inequality has not
remained stable, as is usually assumed in the literature; it experienced a
long-run rise until it reached a stable plateau in the late twentieth century.
Openness conditioned to some extent how much inequality contributed
to poverty reduction. Trade usually raised inequality, and in globalization
phases poverty reduction tended to come from growth. Conversely, in
isolationist phases Stolper-Samuelson forces led to inequality decline and
hence to poverty reduction.
Absolute poverty experienced a long-run decline in Latin America
from the late nineteenth century on, its evolution shadowing that of per
capita income growth. Long-run poverty reduction in Latin America
was led, but not exclusively conditioned, by the growth in average
incomes, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. A lower
degree of initial inequality, it can be conjectured, would have implied
that Latin American growth had a larger payo¤ in terms of poverty
reduction.
Appendix: Data Sources
GDP per Capita and per Worker Volume Indices
In order to facilitate comparisons over space and time, I linked volume
estimates computed at national relative prices to benchmark estimates
for the year 1980 expressed in 1980 Geary-Khamis dollars available for
most Latin American countries from the UN’s International Compari-
sons Project (ICP IV).
Data for twentieth-century Latin American GDP volumes and total
population and economically active population comes, unless stated,
from Astorga and Fitzgerald (1998), Astorga, Berge´s, and Fitzgerald
(2004), and Mitchell (1993).
Argentina Della-Paolera, Taylor, and Bo´zolli (2003), GDP, 1884–1990,
spliced with Corte´s-Conde (1997) for 1875–1984. I assumed the level for
1870 was identical to that of 1875.
Brazil GDP, Goldsmith (1986), 1850–1980.
Chile Dı´az, Lu¨ders, and Wagner (1998) and Braun et al. (1998).
Colombia GRECO (2002), since 1906. I assumed the level for 1900 was
identical to that of 1906.
Mexico INEGI (1995), 1850–1990. GDP figures from 1845 to 1896,
interpolated from the original benchmark estimates.
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Uruguay Be´rtola (1998), since 1870.
Venezuela Baptista (1997).
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua) I obtained the level for 1913 by assuming a growth for
1913–1920 identical to that of 1920–1925, the latter taken from Astorga,
Berge´s, and Fitzgerald (2004).
Real Wages
I used Williamson’s (1995) real wages, updated in 1996 and 2002, for Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay, and completed
the series up to 1960 for Colombia (GRECO 2002), Cuba (Zanetti and
Garcı´a 1976), and Mexico (INEGI 1995). For Chile, I used data in Braun
et al. (1998).
Gini Coefficients
1990 Sze´kely (2001), except Guatemala from London˜o and Sze´kely
(2000).
1970–1980 London˜o and Sze´kely (2000) for Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Costa Rica; Altimir estimates reproduced in Hofman (2001) for Ar-
gentina and Bolivia, 1980; WIDER (2004) for the Dominican Republic,
1980; Deininger and Squire (1996) for Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, 1970; Honduras, 1980; Paraguay, 1980; and Uruguay.
1938–1960 Altimir (1998) estimates reproduced in Astorga and Fitzger-
ald (1998) and Hofman (2001), except for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, and Peru from Deininger and Squire (1996, updated).
Gini Backward Projections
Gini coe‰cients projected backward with inequality indices constructed
as the ratio between unskilled wage indices and GDP per worker, with
1913 ¼ 1.
Notes
Comments, on an earlier draft of this chapter, by Pablo Astorga, Luis Be´rtola, Stefan
Houpt, Humberto Lo´pez, Giovanni Vecchi, and Je¤ Williamson are most appreciated. Ro-
berto Ve´lez Grajales provided excellent research assistance, and Humberto Lo´pez and Patri-
cia Macchi helped me with the calibration of poverty head count. Humberto Lo´pez and Luis
Serve´n kindly allowed me access to their unpublished research. I received valuable feedback
from seminar participants at Harvard, Oxford, Universidad de la Repu´blica (Montevideo),
Lund, Carlos III, and Granada. I am solely responsible for any errors.
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1. EAP stands for ‘‘economically active population.’’ A regression of direct estimates of
Gini coe‰cients on backward projections of Gini for 1980 with inequality indices yields a
partial correlation of 0.86.
2. Population-weighted averages computed from Astorga, Berge´s, and Fitzgerald (2004).
3. This is twice as much in 2004 prices, according to EH.net (S. H. Williamson 2004).
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